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Abstract 
The later Rawls attempts to offer a non-comprehensive, but nonetheless moral 
justification in political philosophy. Many critics of political liberalism doubt that this is 
successful, but Rawlsians often complain that such criticisms rely on the unwarranted 
assumption that one cannot offer a moral justification other than by taking a 
philosophically comprehensive route. In this paper, I internally criticise the justification 
strategy employed by the later Rawls. I show that he cannot offer us good grounds for 
the rational hope that citizens will assign political values priority over non-political 
values in cases of conflict about political matters. I also suggest an alternative approach 
to justification in political philosophy – a weak realist, Williams-inspired account – that 
respects better the later Rawls‘ concern with non-comprehensiveness and pluralism than 
either his own view or more comprehensive approaches. Thus, if we take reasonable 
pluralism seriously, then we should adopt what Shklar aptly called ‗liberalism of fear‘. 
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Value pluralism is a pervasive feature of modern democratic societies and, while we 
might at one level celebrate the diversity of worldviews, this diversity also presents a 
serious obstacle to justifying the use of state power to citizens of these societies. The 
dominant approach to such justification within contemporary political philosophy 
centrally rests its case on (re)constructing a conception of justice that is meant to be 
rationally acceptable to each citizen. This purportedly leaves room for diversity when it 
comes to the ethical question of what the good life is. Whether or not it does is often 
doubted, but pervasive pluralism gives rise to a more worrying objection. The dominant, 
broadly Kantian picture relies heavily on a number of philosophically controversial 
assumptions, even if it eschews – as is now common – the more metaphysically 
sounding claims of its 18
th
 century founding father (such as claims about intelligible 
selves and transcendental freedom). In particular, this position (1) builds on specific 
views in metaethics (such as constructivism), (2) often comes with a particular 
conception of truth or practical validity, and (3) depends on strong assumptions in moral 
psychology (namely, the assumption that citizens can be moved by what Rawls called 
conception-dependent desires, specifically their sense of justice). All of these 
commitments are controversial, and they are controversial in a way which should be 
worrying to Kantians: a consensus on these matters is lacking, even after free discussion 
among people who are willing to be convinced by arguments. If it is true that 
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philosophical pluralism survives among reasonable people (as Rawls calls them), then 
no authoritative specification of rational acceptability will be available, and, hence, no 
justification of the conception of justice.  
 In his later (post-1985) writings, Rawls tries to address this difficulty by 
adopting what he calls ‗political liberalism‘. His key idea is to formulate a conception of 
justice which is freestanding in a double sense: (1) it is freestanding from moral and 
ethical values beyond the political sphere (for example, it is agnostic about whether 
surfing or monastic devotion leads to the good life); and (2) it is also freestanding from 
philosophically controversial questions (such as the nature of truth, or the sources of 
normativity). In Rawlsian terminology, it is a political, not metaphysical conception; it 
is both ethically and philosophically non-comprehensive.
1
 At the same time, it is still 
meant to be a moral conception.
2
 In fact, Rawls aspires to offer a fully moral 
justification, where this involves that both the content of what is justified and the 
reasons supporting it are moral, that is, they are based on values and principles, not on 
group- or self-interest.
3
 How is this to be achieved? Rawls claims that, despite the 
plurality of worldviews, there is actually common ground among citizens of modern 
democratic societies when it comes to deciding what to do in the political sphere. 
Admittedly, this common ground is only superficial in nature: there is agreement among 
reasonable citizens about political values and certain considered judgements, but not 
about their wider moral and philosophical foundations. Still, it does not matter that the 
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agreement is only superficial. As long as there is sufficient common ground to build a 
conception of justice which is non-comprehensive in the double sense specified above, 
then citizens might come to accept that conception, despite the disagreements about its 
deeper foundations. In this way, it might be possible to achieve agreement with 
philosophical foundations, but without this having to involve agreement on what these 
foundations are.  
 Many critics of the later Rawls doubt that this way of redirecting the search for a 
conception of justice is successful or attractive. In particular, they question that political 
liberalism is suitable to furnish what Rawls still takes to be the only adequate form of 
justification in political philosophy: a fully moral justification (as specified above).
4
 
 However, Rawlsians often complain that these critics merely assume what is at 
issue – namely, that the only way one can build a fully moral justification in political 
philosophy is by way of a philosophically comprehensive route.
5
 Why assume that 
when reasonable people agree that something is rationally acceptable, these people also 
need to agree about what makes it rationally acceptable? And why think that epistemic 
abstinence is a problem, when stronger claims are either unnecessary (because there 
already is a consensus) or unhelpful (when deep disagreements about the philosophical 
issues prevails)? To insist on the truth of one‘s conception of justice is merely to 
emphatically stamp one‘s foot. In sum, those defending the theory of the later Rawls 
argue that the critics do not sufficiently examine this theory on its own merits.  
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 In this paper, I will take up this challenge and argue by way of internal critique 
against the justification strategy offered by the later Rawls, showing it to fail on its own 
terms and without presupposing that philosophical comprehensiveness is necessary. I 
begin by laying out Rawls‘ strategy (section I). Then, I submit it to critical scrutiny 
(section II). Finally, I suggest an alternative way to think about justification in political 
philosophy – a way that better respects the later Rawls‘ concern with non-
comprehensiveness and pluralism by giving up on the ideal of a fully moral justification 
(section III). Thus, if we follow the later Rawls in taking reasonable pluralism seriously, 
then we should adopt ‗liberalism of fear‘ instead of his political liberalism. 
 
I. Rawls on justification in political philosophy 
The later Rawls is most explicit about his conception of justification in ‗Reply to 
Habermas‘.6 He distinguishes between three levels of justification, in which citizens of 
democratic societies engage.
7
  
 The first level of justification concerns the coherence and completeness of 
political values in dealing with all questions which arise in respect to the political 
sphere.
8
 It is here that the original position and the idea of a reflective equilibrium find 
their home in the theory of the later Rawls. Citizens start from their shared intuitions, 
our considered judgements, about the political; organise these intuitions and political 
values by constructing an heuristic device (the original position) which generates 
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principles of justice; they then check these principles against their initial intuitions and 
values; and then repeat this process until reaching a stable equilibrium, by either 
qualifying and dropping intuitions, or modifying the construction of the original 
position (so that it yields different principles), or both.
9
 This first level of justification 
constitutes merely a pro tanto justification, since citizens have checked only for 
coherence and completeness of the shared political values and intuitions, not for 
whether the result is acceptable to each of them individually, as liberal legitimacy 
demands.
10
  
 Rawls divides this latter step into two levels. At the second level of justification 
(‗full justification‘) each citizen checks individually whether or not her reasonable 
doctrine allows her to support the political conception of justice constructed at the first 
level of justification and thereby to accept the priority of political over non-political 
values.
11
 Finally, citizens need to find assurance not only that they themselves 
individually, but also that all other citizens (or, at least, a sufficiently large majority of 
them) affirm the political conception from within their respective (reasonable) 
worldviews.  
 This third level of justification is called ‗public justification‘ by Rawls. This 
label is somewhat misleading since he does not think that citizens jointly reconstruct a 
normative basis for their political conception (as Habermas argues should be the case).
12
 
Rather, the third level of justification consists in finding out whether or not an 
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overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines exists.
13
 Such a consensus is different 
from a mere compromise. Its object – the political conception of justice – has a pro 
tanto justification in moral terms and it is also supported for moral reasons from within 
the respective reasonable comprehensive doctrines of citizens, that is, for moral reasons 
external to the political conception which will differ from one citizen to another. In this 
way, an overlapping consensus makes ‗stability for the right reasons‘ possible.14 Such 
stability is special insofar as the political-social institutions are supported by moral 
reasons (and at two levels: the level of pro tanto justification and from within 
comprehensive doctrines).
15
 It is also special in a further sense: according to Rawls, a 
morally endorsed stability is more long-lasting than a prudential compromise (a ‗mere 
modus vivendi‘ in his terms), since it is not hostage to the fortune of shifting power 
alliances.
16
 Furthermore, in aiming for a morally endorsed stability, Rawls is aiming for 
what I call a fully moral justification in political philosophy: both the object of his 
theory (a conception of justice detailing a well-ordered society which is stable for the 
right reasons) and the reasons supporting it are moral in nature (both political-moral and 
comprehensive-moral). 
 In sum, at the third level of justification, citizens assign normative weight to the 
existence of an overlapping consensus, since its emergence confirms that it is possible 
to arrive at principles for fair cooperation over time, while also respecting their different 
(reasonable) comprehensive worldviews. The collective use of coercive power is 
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justified to each citizen‘s reason and judgement in a way that is compatible both with 
reasonable pluralism and with holding on to the idea of a fully moral justification. 
 Given how the third level of justification is conceived, it becomes 
understandable why the key question for the later Rawls is ‗how is an overlapping 
consensus possible?‘.17 He needs to show that his hope that citizens will assign political 
values priority over non-political values is warranted.
18
 In other words, it becomes 
understandable why Rawls proceeds by way of explanation: he does not ask whether an 
overlapping consensus would justify the political conception (in the sense of making it 
true or valid or morally wrong to oppose), but, rather, asks how we can account for the 
possibility that such a consensus can come into existence. Given that political liberalism 
wants to be philosophically neutral, no deeper justificatory story is possible – the 
normative resources of political liberalism are exhausted when it comes to justifying 
political values and their priority itself. It has to be left to each individual how non-
political and political values are ranked. The political conception (even a pro tanto 
justified one) cannot give guidance on this or require that political values are given 
priority within the political sphere – otherwise it would cease to be a political 
conception and become philosophically comprehensive.
19
 However, once an 
overlapping consensus has arisen, the priority of political values is no longer in question 
– the existence of an overlapping consensus attests to their having been assigned this 
priority.
20
 Hence, an explanation of how an overlapping consensus is possible is all what 
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is available and all what is required to complete the justification of the political 
conception of justice – or, at least, this is what Rawls claims.  
 Before examining Rawls‘ response to his explanatory question, we should 
consider what would be – in his own eyes – a successful answer. Rawls seems to believe 
that, though an overlapping consensus on political liberalism does not yet exist, our 
modern democratic societies contain all the material required for the construction of a 
liberal political conception of justice.
21
 Even if he is right about this,
22
 it would only 
provide a necessary condition for the possibility an overlapping consensus – the fact 
that a political conception can be constructed does not by itself show that an 
overlapping consensus would form around such a conception.  
A helpful clue about what would count as a successful answer for Rawls can be 
gained by looking at the central aim of his theory: ‗(...) the defense of the possibility of 
a just constitutional democratic regime‘, specifically ‗(...) the defense of reasonable 
faith‘ in such a possibility.23 Without rational hope of this kind, we could not be 
obligated to work towards the realisation of justice. Unless we are sufficiently assured 
that an overlapping consensus could emerge, it would be unfair to ask us to work 
towards achieving this. We could also not be reconciled to our modern social world – 
for its current imperfections would then be permanent. In other words, political 
philosophy can only fulfil its functions, if it offers adequate reasons for the possibility 
of its ideal(s).
24
 Yet, under the conditions of reasonable pluralism a just society is only 
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realistically utopian, if an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice 
could underpin it. In this sense, the task of finding sufficient grounds for the hope that a 
reasonably just society is possible, in effect, comes down to the task of finding 
sufficient grounds for the rational hope that such an overlapping consensus is possible.
25
 
The crucial point is not so much whether or not a reasonable just society based on an 
overlapping consensus will ever come about, but whether we can give good reasons for 
believing it to be possible to come about.
26
 In fact, certain ways of its coming about are 
not going to count as answers to the explanatory quest – if citizens were brainwashed 
into an overlapping consensus, or it just occurred as a matter of lucky coincidence, then 
this would not satisfy the demand of rational hope. A cast-iron guarantee is not 
necessary, but mere logical possibility would not suffice.
27
  
Thus, the key question is whether or not Rawls can offer good grounds for the 
possibility that an overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice could 
arise.  
 
II. An internal critique  
Rawls begins his explanation of how such an overlapping consensus is possible by 
considering a mere modus vivendi, in which citizens with competing doctrines have 
agreed on a liberal conception of justice for strategic reasons, such as the consideration 
that it would be too costly to impose one‘s views on others, given the distribution of 
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power among the different groups. Rawls draws on the historical parallel with the pre-
Westphalian world to show how such a modus vivendi would arise: it would emerge 
‗(...) at first reluctantly, but nevertheless as providing the only workable alternative to 
endless and destructive civil strive‘.28 Thus, the hope would be that, despite the 
entrenched pluralism, most parties could see that it is rational to agree on mutual 
toleration in a liberal society and that such a modus vivendi would thus not be an 
unlikely development. Some theorists stress how much luck is at play even in this 
development.
29
 Be that as it may be, the explanatory question for Rawls becomes ‗how 
can a mere modus vivendi develop into a lasting overlapping consensus?‘. 
 In answer to this question, Rawls envisions that living under conditions of a 
modus vivendi and benefiting from these conditions of toleration will foster independent 
support for toleration and the values associated with it.
30
 In this way, first a 
‗constitutional consensus‘ on the liberal principles of political justice and then a full 
overlapping consensus on the (liberal) political conception of justice as a whole could 
emerge.
31
 However, Rawls is aware that there are obstacles to such a development. In 
particular, there might be some issues, such as the question of the permissibility of 
abortion, where political values and non-political values could be in conflict. Such 
conflicts could prevent citizens from endorsing political values as supremely normative 
and thereby prevent an overlapping consensus from forming. More importantly still, it 
is such conflicts which raise doubts about whether or not Rawls‘ explanation provides 
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adequate reasons for the possibility of an overlapping consensus.  
 Rawls addresses the issue of the priority of political values as follows. Firstly, he 
claims that political values are ‗very great values and hence not easily overridden‘.32 
Secondly, he propounds that ‗[p]olitical liberalism counts many familiar and traditional 
doctrines – religious, philosophical and moral – as reasonable (...)‘.33 As such, these 
doctrines could partake in an overlapping consensus on political liberalism and, at least 
insofar as they are widely subscribed to, this explains how such a consensus is possible 
(or, at any rate, provides reasonable grounds for hope). Rawls does not discuss all of the 
main contenders for reasonable conceptions of the good and check for their 
compatibility with the political conception of justice. What he does do is to present ‗a 
model case of an overlapping consensus‘, that is, he presents a case of how a religious 
view, two comprehensive liberal doctrines (Mill‘s and Kant‘s), and a non-systematic 
(‗pluralist‘) worldview can come to endorse the political conception of justice and 
assign it priority in cases of conflict with comprehensive values.
34
 At a later stage, he 
also adds classical Utilitarianism to the model case.
35
 Thirdly, severe conflicts with 
other values are much reduced, Rawls argues, because of the philosophical agnosticism 
of political liberalism. Specifically, political liberalism does not imply that political 
values, all things considered, are intrinsically the most important values.
36
 Thus, one 
could give non-political values priority in decisions concerning one‘s everyday life (as 
long as these decisions do not impinge on political matters) and in one‘s overall value 
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theory (as long as this does not call into question the priority of political values when it 
comes to questions concerning the basic structure of society). Fourthly, citizens do not 
just value outcomes, but also the legitimacy of democratic decision-making procedures, 
and this might give them a sufficient reason to continue to endorse political liberalism, 
even if they disagree with the decisions taken by the majority on particular policy 
matters, such as going to war or making abortion legal.
37
 Finally, and most importantly, 
Rawls argues that most citizens have merely incomplete (‗partial‘) and loose 
conceptions of the good, and this will make it easier for political values to be integrated 
within these doctrines in such a way that they are assigned priority over other values on 
questions of basic justice.
38
  
 None of these reasons are convincing. As has been widely pointed out, the first 
one just asserts what is at issue, namely, whether or not political values have sufficient 
normative force to trump non-political ones in cases of conflict.
39
 To some extent, 
Rawls is here guilty of the same problematic move which he and his defenders criticise 
in those who belong to the truth camp: to say that political values are great values is to 
emphatically stamp one‘s foot, not to give an argument.40 Perhaps, the point is that in 
giving non-political values priority over political ones, a citizen would be risking the 
social order of modern democracies and the goods it brings. However, it is unclear what 
else this is other than an appeal to prudential considerations (which are not relevant for 
a fully moral justification but more apt to support a modus vivendi). Also, one need not 
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deny that political virtues and values help secure important goods (such as a liberal 
democratic order and the benefits such a system brings) to question that this secures 
their priority in all cases of conflict with other goods – even important values and goods 
are sometimes outweighed. Moreover, as Rawls admits,
41
 it is not true that only political 
liberalism can secure the goods in question; something more minimal would do (such as 
agreement about basic principles and procedures, or a consensus on avoiding great 
evils). 
 One might reply here that this criticism overlooks that the political conception 
has moral value in respecting the fact of oppression (that is, the fact that a 
comprehensive doctrine could not be justified to citizens divided by reasonable 
pluralism, but only coercively imposed on them).
42
 Thus, those who deny the priority of 
the political over the non-political values in the political domain are unreasonable, since 
they are prepared to give up on the idea of justification acceptable to each citizen in 
their court of reason and impose their view on them, even at the expense of the evil of 
oppression.  
However, this reply misses the mark. Firstly, it is not true that only a fully moral 
justification would respect the fact of oppression – a more minimal justification could 
do so too (such as liberalism of fear, to which I return below). Indeed, it is not even 
clear that respect for the fact of oppression is best characterised as moral, since 
someone might accept this as a fact and decide to forego imposition of his or her 
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comprehensive doctrine for strategic or prudential reasons alone. Such a citizen can still 
accept that there is good reason to avoid oppression and to justify the coercive use of 
power to each other on the grounds that are acceptable to citizens divided by reasonable 
pluralism, but reject fully moral justifications as unsuitable. In fact, such a citizen could 
reject the latter because of the former: for example, by arguing that any talk of moral is 
(at least philosophically) comprehensive and, hence, controversial (I return to this below 
when discussing Rawls‘ second reason).  
Secondly, and more importantly, a political conception cannot remain 
freestanding if it includes the claim that the value of avoiding oppression will always 
trump all other values – for such a claim is about the relationship of values all things 
considered and, hence, a matter internal to comprehensive doctrines. To say that those 
who assign the evil of oppression some value, but deny that it has independent or 
trumping value, are unreasonable would be both to beg the question and to step beyond 
the strictures of political liberalism. Here, Rawls is normally more careful than those 
who purport to defend him: at least in his most consistent moments, he avoids any 
claims about the overriding nature of the political (moral) values (or about their 
cognitive or rational superiority), since he realises that to makes such claims would 
involve venturing into the realm of comprehensiveness and thereby controversy. In sum, 
his insistence on the greatness of political values either is not doing any real work, or 
commits him to a comprehensive view and is thereby inadmissible within political 
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liberalism.  
 The second reason is also problematic. Here the issue is less whether or not 
some sort of consensus of reasonable doctrines is possible, but more whether or not a 
consensus on political liberalism is possible. In effect, Rawls faces a dilemma here. On 
the one hand, he could understand ‗reasonable‘ in ‗reasonable doctrines‘ in a restrictive 
sense. For example, he could make it part of the definition that reasonable doctrines 
accept the political conception of justice, including the priority of political values. The 
problem is that this makes compatibility a matter of definitional fiat and too many 
‗familiar and traditional doctrines‘ might turn out to be unreasonable on this restrictive 
definition of it. Consequently, stability for the right reasons could not be achieved (or, at 
least, we do not have good reasons for hoping that it will). If the majority of citizens in 
a Rawlsian just society would be coerced on grounds they would themselves not accept, 
then it would be mainly force, not moral motivations, which would hold this society 
together. On the other hand, Rawls could understand ‗reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines‘ in a sufficiently loose sense, without making acceptance of political 
liberalism part of the definition. This would make it more likely that the familiar and 
traditional doctrines will be counted among the reasonable doctrines. However, then the 
problem is that we have no good reasons to think that all or most of the reasonable 
doctrines would support the political conception of justice (or that they will support it as 
a morally justified conception).  
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 In fact, Rawls is, by the reckoning of almost all commentators, too optimistic in 
his model case. For example, Barry argues that neither classical Utilitarianism, nor the 
views contained in the major world religions need to imply the full list of equal basic 
liberties or their priority (as is required of any member of the family of liberal principles 
of justice).
43
 Similarly, Kymlicka suggests that accepting the fact of reasonable 
pluralism and the need for mutual toleration is insufficient for showing that one ought to 
support a liberal regime over, for example, the Millet system of mutual toleration 
practised in the Ottoman Empire.
44
 Moreover, according to Simmons, anti-state 
anarchists or pacifists would reasonably reject political liberalism because of its ‗(...) 
precommitment to finding political solutions to social problems‘.45  
 Other commentators contend that many traditional and familiar doctrines would 
only accept the liberal political conception of justice, if it is slimmed down 
considerably. Thus, Scheffler argues that traditional doctrines, such as Utilitarianism, 
could, at most, come to accept the principles of justice themselves, but not the political 
values and the conception of the person underpinning them.
46
 This would mean that 
actual acceptance of the political conception would come at the expense of stability for 
the right reasons and the idea of an overlapping consensus as different from a modus 
Vivendi – the political moral values which Rawls wanted to place within the political 
conceptions would no longer be included within it and, hence, citizens would not 
endorse the political conception for moral reasons (or, at least, not for moral reasons 
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internal to this conception). Additionally, Wenar suggests that for Rawls‘ conception of 
justice to qualify as political, it needs to drop, among other things, the idea of 
conception-dependent desires (which is part of his ‗reasonable moral psychology‘), 
since Humeans, Hobbesians, and Utilitarians would reject this idea.
47
 This further drains 
the moral content from the political conception of justice. 
 One might reply here that even if the political conception would have to be 
slimmed down and thereby lose much of its moral content, citizens could still support it 
for moral reasons – albeit then only for moral reasons from within their respective 
comprehensive doctrines. However, the problem with this reply is that there is no reason 
to suppose that this would happen in all cases.
48
 For example, the support from within a 
pluralist worldview would be, as even defenders of Rawls admit, pragmatic (albeit a 
pragmatism based on philosophical argument, not mere expediency); and religious 
believers would base their support not on moral values, but on the belief that religion 
needs to be freely chosen to be authentic.
49
 Moreover, political liberalism cannot require 
that citizens support the political conception for moral reasons. By eschewing 
philosophical claims about moral rightness and leaving it to each individual to find 
comprehensive reasons to support the political conception, Rawls deprives himself of 
any basis to justify such a requirement. If it transcends a political conception of justice 
to argue that each comprehensive doctrine should give political values priority, then 
surely it also transcends it to insist that the reasons supporting the overlapping 
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consensus are moral ones. In fact, even the judgement about whether or not the reasons 
of support are moral is difficult to make from the standpoint of political liberalism, 
since this judgement is philosophically controversial – Kantians, for example, would not 
think of the reasons that Utilitarians would give to support the political conception of 
justice as moral reasons, while Utilitarians would do so. Even Rawls‘ own 
understanding of ‗moral‘ is philosophically controversial – there are reasonable people 
who and doctrines which would link self- or group-interest with morality, possibly as its 
foundation.
50
 A philosophically agnostic, truly political conception of justice should 
refrain from dividing the supporting reasons into moral and non-moral ones. Hence, 
Rawls can neither insist that the support should be moral, nor make claims about 
whether or not the support actually is moral. 
 Taking all of these considerations together, Rawls is either wrong in thinking 
that political liberalism is compatible with the familiar and traditional doctrines, or he 
cannot provide a fully moral justification. Either way, we still have not been given good 
grounds for the rational hope that stability for the right reasons and an overlapping 
consensus (as different from a modus vivendi) are attainable.  
 The third reason Rawls offers to explain why citizens would assign priority to 
political values is also unconvincing. The fact that political values are not presented as, 
all things considered, the most important values is little comfort to those who are 
hesitant about giving them priority in political matters. This is especially so as the 
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extent of the political in Rawls‘ conception is, arguably, very far-reaching.51 We are, 
after all, talking of all the questions which affect the political, economic and major 
social institutions, either directly or indirectly.
52
 Thus, many central issues in our lives 
will be political and, hence, be affected by the priority of political over non-political 
values. This means that conceding that non-political values have possibly greater 
importance than political ones outside of the political sphere will make little practical 
difference, and it is unlikely that those who reject the priority of political values within 
the political sphere will be satisfied by this concession. Consequently, the priority of 
political values could stay controversial and give rise to conflicts, even if this priority is 
limited in scope to the political sphere.  
 The fourth consideration, that is, having recourse to the value of the procedural 
legitimacy of democratic decision-making, is also insufficient to account for the priority 
of political values. Furthermore, this is the case on Rawls‘ own conception of 
procedural legitimacy. Rawls distinguishes legitimacy from justice, though he also 
claims that legitimacy cannot deviate too far from justice without becoming 
‗corrupted‘.53 Thus, while the two notions do not coincide, legitimacy is still 
constrained by justice: it is a ‗purely procedural‘ ideal, but only within a certain range of 
not too unjust outcomes.
54
 In effect, the constitutional essentials fix the range of 
reasonably just outcomes, within which we can use legitimate procedures to choose 
specific policies. The constitutional essentials themselves, on the other hand, are not 
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legitimated with the help of democratic procedures. They need to be justified by 
‗addressing each citizen‘s reason‘.55 This means that the value which citizens might 
attach to democratic procedures is, on Rawls‘ own account of it, only relevant when it 
comes to accepting an unwelcome policy, not when it comes to the constitutional 
essentials – in the latter case, the value of democratic procedures is not of the right kind 
to outweigh concerns one might have about substantive issues.
56
 Yet, the question of the 
priority of political over non-political values does not just come in at the level of policy 
issues, but also at the level of constitutional essentials. Admittedly, Rawls might claim 
that, for example, the debate about the permissibility of abortion is merely a debate 
about policy issues. However, at least the pro-life side of the debate would beg to differ: 
they would argue that the inviolability of human life is at stake in the debate and that 
this is clearly a constitutional essential.
57
 
 The final reason Rawls offers to explain how citizens would give political values 
priority is also problematic. The obstacle to this priority is less that citizens‘s 
comprehensive conceptions of the good are complete or tightly systematised – Rawls 
might be right that most citizens‘s doctrines are neither. Rather, the real obstacle is how 
strongly citizens are attached to individual elements in their doctrines.
58
 Thus, someone 
might subscribe to a not fully worked out worldview, but still think that there are certain 
fixed points, such as the claims (a) that slavery is wrong (something which Rawls 
agrees is a fixed point in the modern world),
59
 or (b) the claim that abortion should be 
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outlawed (something Rawls does not endorse).
60
 No matter what views citizens with 
incomplete and loose doctrines will adopt about truth or metaphysics, it is not unlikely 
that they would want to hold on to their fixed points – they constitute bright white lines 
which citizens would not be prepared to cross.
61
 Hence, the main obstacle to assigning 
priority to political values is not completeness or systematicity of comprehensive 
doctrines, but that citizens have firm commitments. The debate about the moral and 
legal permissibility of abortion is the most obvious example here (especially in the 
context of US politics). The pro-life side could, for example, argue ‗(...) that their 
religious conviction concerning the inviolability of life is more important than any 
political value in whose name other citizens urge them to accept, say, a moderately 
liberal regulation [of abortion]‘.62 Crucially, the importance assigned to the inviolability 
of life can be independent of the degree of completeness or systematicity of the 
comprehensive doctrines held by religious citizens of this sort. Moreover, while the 
abortion debate is the most obvious example of where citizens would insist on the 
priority of certain non-political values in cases of conflict with political values, it is not 
the only one – other examples include the education of children, the right to a basic 
income, the death penalty, and the internal organisation of voluntary associations.
63
  
 One might think that other features ascribed to reasonable citizens could help to 
bolster Rawls‘ claim that such citizens would tend to give political values priority, such 
as the fact that they are willing to abide by fair terms, even to the detriment of their own 
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self-interest, have high-levels of trust towards each other, and are likely to support 
political values for their own sake.
64
 However, this rejoinder is unsuccessful. The 
conflicts in question are not clashes between self-interest and political justice, but 
between non-political and political values. Hence, the fact that the conception-based 
desire to abide by fair terms can outweigh or trump desires based on self-interest does 
not make a difference here. Furthermore, while trust and independent support of 
political values give us some reason to expect that citizens will support political 
liberalism in the case of value conflicts, they do not themselves give us sufficient 
grounds for this. Unless we are given additional reasons to think that it is rational to 
expect political values to be given priority, the mere fact that they might be given this 
priority leaves too much to chance. 
 In sum, none of the five reasons advanced by Rawls to explain why citizens 
would give political values priority over non-political values in the political sphere is 
convincing. Consequently, Rawls‘ explanatory project fails. His theory lacks the 
resources to account for the possibility that an overlapping consensus will arise, since 
his epistemic abstinence and strategy of avoidance have left him empty-handed in 
dealing with the crucial issue of the priority of political values. At most, the emergence 
of an overlapping consensus (and thereby of citizens assigning priority to political 
values) would take place as a matter of ‗lucky coincidence‘.65 Yet, as Rawls would 
agree,
66
 reliance on luck is not a sufficiently good reason for rational hope. Whether or 
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not an overlapping consensus will ever come about is not the issue. If Rawls could 
underwrite the possibility of it coming about, then the instant destruction of all human 
life by an asteroid impact would not invalidate his theory. By the same token, the 
validation of the theory requires more than that an overlapping consensus might come 
about as a matter of lucky coincidence. 
 
 This shows that the problem with the theory of the later Rawls is not just that an 
overlapping consensus is impossible or unlikely, but deeper. The problem is that he 
claims that he can still deliver a fully moral justification of the conception of justice. He 
does not realise that it is insufficient for such a justification to have stability for the right 
reasons as an aim, but not to have an account of how such stability could arise for the 
right reasons, that is, moral reasons which could justify why moving to an overlapping 
consensus and giving political values priority over non-political ones is the right thing 
to do. In order to achieve what Rawls sets out to achieve, he would have to appeal to the 
kind of Kantian arguments about moral rightness and truth which he wants to avoid – to 
arguments which would show that, whatever particular worldview one subscribes to, 
our autonomous will guided by practical reason requires us to give justice priority.
67
 
While this view might not be metaphysical in a traditional sense, it is certainly 
comprehensive in Rawls‘ sense. It might not contain all of the recognised values and 
virtues or aspire to govern all spheres of life, but it comes with a particular conception 
of practical reason and autonomy that is philosophically controversial. Thus, it does not 
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extending the principle of toleration to philosophy itself (as Rawls demands of a 
political conception).
68
  
 Hence, there is an underlying tension in the views of the later Rawls: he remains 
committed to stability for the right reasons, but he can no longer back this up with an 
account of how such stability could arise for the right reasons, despite the fact that the 
latter is required for the former. Thus, Rawls cannot provide what he sets out to provide: 
a fully moral justification of his conception of justice. 
 
III. The moral of the story: comprehensive justice or non-Rawlsian legitimacy 
Where does this leave the question of justification in political philosophy? Habermas 
has a clear answer: he thinks that a procedural, but philosophically comprehensive 
account is both unavoidable and possible.
69
 Dworkin and Raz would agree with the 
need for philosophical comprehensiveness, but take a more substantive route instead 
(such as, in Dworkin‘s case, relying on the challenge model of the good life).70 
Similarly, others also argue that a defence of liberal political philosophy cannot be 
philosophically neutral in the way the later Rawls claims, and they suggest going back 
to something like the picture presented by the early Rawls.
71
 
 However, one could also give up on the idea of fully moral justifications and 
move to a realist picture. Realism in political philosophy can take two different forms. 
According to its strong variant, politics is just a game of power and self-interest, and 
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political philosophy ignores this at its peril.
72
 On this picture, justifications play no or at 
most an epiphenomenal role. Weak realists, on the other hand, can admit that the 
influence of moral reasons and ideals on politics is not always futile or illegitimate (and 
that political philosophy should make use of them). Still, for them politics is not merely 
an exercise in applied ethics, that is, politics is not the implementation of a moral 
conception which is conceived or constructed independently of what are, according to 
weak realism, the distinctive features of the political realm (such as the importance and 
difficulty of maintaining civil order; the limitations of political agents; and entrenched 
value pluralism).
73
  
 In fact, adopting a realist outlook would respect the key motivation behind 
Rawls‘ move to political liberalism better than holding on to the idea of fully moral 
justifications at the expense of philosophical neutrality. It was the recognition of the fact 
of reasonable pluralism which made Rawls give up on the philosophical status of these 
views.
74
 Moreover, because of this fact, there may be something to the idea that 
justification in political philosophy needs to be non-comprehensive. To recall, the main 
idea of reasonable pluralism is that there is so much leeway involved in the judgements 
which make up our worldviews that even reasonable citizens can disagree about which 
worldview is the right one.
75
 This is to say that even citizens who are genuinely willing 
to be convinced by reasons need not necessarily agree on this matter, even if the 
discussion has been free and the conditions ideal for the exchange of reasons. 
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Importantly, reasonable pluralism extends to philosophical issues itself (such as to 
questions about the correct conception of moral rightness and truth, or about the nature 
of practical justification).
76
 Thus, it might not be unreasonable to deny that moral 
discourse is epistemic (contrary to what, for example, Habermas or Raz think), or to 
reject that political legitimacy requires giving citizens moral reasons, or to argue against 
the categorical nature of morality and justice.
 
 One upshot of this is that justification in 
political philosophy should not only be neutral between different conceptions of the 
good (as Habermas, Dworkin and Raz maintain their views are). Rather, it should also 
be philosophically neutral.  
 Perhaps, the best way to achieve this is to adopt a weak realist perspective, such 
as one influenced by the work of Williams. He does not think that politics – even at its 
best – is or should be merely the application of moral ideals and reasons. This makes 
him a realist, albeit of the weak kind, since he is not against the idea of justification or 
the role of moral ideals and reasons in politics per se. In fact, according to Williams, a 
claim to legitimacy (though perhaps not to justice) is constitutive of politics, not an 
external and independent moral standard brought to it.
77
 In contrast to naked conflict or 
warfare, politics is about rulers claiming that they wield coercive power with legitimate 
authority and that citizens would be wrong to fight back. Now, often this claim might be 
false, but at least it suggests that the question of legitimacy cannot be neatly separated 
from politics, and with that question, the further question of justification is on the table 
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from the start as well. Moreover, Williams admits what both Habermas and Rawls insist 
on, namely, that in the modern world the questions of legitimacy and justification need 
to be answered in a way which addresses each citizen‘s reason and judgement, 
something which (Williams further admits) cannot be achieved by appeal to traditional 
authority.
78
 Yet, he would also argue that these questions can be answered without 
aiming for, or demanding, stability for the right reasons. In other words, he would 
refrain from giving a fully moral justification. In fact, it is here where a completely non-
comprehensive liberalism might be at home.  
 Admittedly, Williams has strong views on philosophical issues, such as whether 
or not moral discourse is epistemic.
79
 Still, perhaps he would be prepared to bracket 
these views for the purpose of political philosophy. At any rate, a non-comprehensive 
liberalism inspired by Williams could do so. Thus, the view I am sketching here might 
differ substantially from Williams‘s actual view in political philosophy, at least if the 
latter is understood to include the whole range of his philosophical commitments. Yet, I 
can see nothing in Williams‘s characterisation of the political which would prevent us 
from adopting this characterisation within a liberalism which is non-comprehensive 
both doctrinally and philosophically.
80
 
 Like Rawls‘ political liberalism, such a Williams-inspired liberalism would tie 
its content to what is acceptable to actual citizens who are willing to cooperate with 
others. Unlike Rawls‘s view, however, this content would be more minimal; the 
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agreement would not be seen to have moral significance; and the cooperating parties 
would not have to be reasonable in the full Rawlsian sense. On this view, legitimacy 
would merely require that the universally accepted evils of coercion, pain, oppression, 
torture, humiliation, and premature death are avoided – for Williams, this evaluative 
standard is the minimal core of the idea of legitimacy and thereby of the idea of politics 
(as a solution to disorder and warfare). Adopting this perspective, one might then 
suggests that, given the experiences of the past millennia, avoidance of these evils might 
be best achieved by adopting democratic governance, basic liberties, and a social safety 
net. In such a way, this liberalism (a ‗liberalism of fear‘)81 would also arrive at a liberal 
conception of legitimacy. However, it would not do so on the grounds of a moral 
conception of personhood or on the grounds of the quasi-transcendental presuppositions 
of discourses, but instead on the grounds of historical experience. And it would leave it 
to each individual to fill in their (further) reasons in support of this liberalism, even if 
that meant that they did support it for merely prudential reasons. Admittedly, there 
would be no cast-iron defence of the political regime so legitimated; only a prudential 
reminder that civil order is difficult to achieve and should not be put in jeopardy unless 
it is absolutely unavoidable. Such liberalism cannot lay claim to grounding stability for 
the right reasons. It could at most say that it would be a lucky coincidence if such 
stability arose, but, as we saw, Rawls cannot say more than this either. Whereas this 
element of luck is problematic for the Rawlsian enterprise, it does not present any 
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difficulties for the liberalism of fear (at least not at the level of theorising), since the 
latter does not consist in the attempt to explain how stability for the right reasons is 
possible. 
 How would a liberalism of fear handle the difficult cases considered earlier, such 
as the (im)permissibility of abortion, or objections to the public education of children? 
Much of the debate would presumably be conducted in terms of the universally 
accepted evils mentioned above. Admittedly, for many morally and doctrinally 
contentious issues, such as abortion, this is unlikely to suffice for a consensus – the evil 
of premature death is one of the factors the pro-life side would emphasise, while the 
pro-choice side would view legal restrictions as oppressive use of state power. If taking 
a legal stance is unavoidable (as with abortion), then whatever legal regime is put in 
place will depend – as always in democratic politics – on a mixture of interests, 
pressure, the imagination and resourcefulness of the different actors involved, and other 
factors impacting on the institutional mechanisms that pass and regulate such a regime. 
As a limiting case, liberalism of fear would provide dissenters to an existing legal 
regime only with prudential reasons against taking violent means to oppose this regime. 
It would also provide such reasons in defence of legally constituted and consistently 
administered use of state power to maintain civil order against violent dissenters. 
Whether this will always suffice to avoid such violence or to hold together a society, is 
an open question. The key point is that, if the arguments put forward earlier are correct, 
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then Rawls‘ Political Liberalism is in no better position: nothing in liberalism of fear 
excludes the emergence – by lucky coincidence – of a thicker, moral consensus; and 
nothing in the Rawls‘ view can underpin anything more than the prudential 
consideration mobilised by liberalism of fear and the possibility of a lucky coincidence. 
 Those who think that more is required would have to turn to philosophically 
comprehensive accounts (be it of a procedural or substantive kind). Nothing I argued 
here bars them from doing so, though they face the challenge of having to address 
reasonable pluralism on both doctrinal and philosophical matters. What I have argued is 
that when it comes to justification in political philosophy one has to decide between 
fully moral, but comprehensive views (such as Habermas‘s or Dworkin‘s), on the one 
hand, and non-Rawlsian views of legitimacy (such as Williams‘s) that need not be 
comprehensive, on the other hand. Either way, what is not tenable is the position of the 
later Rawls, who aims to have both – a fully moral view and non-comprehensiveness.  
 
Reference list 
Baier K (1989) Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy. Ethics 99(4): 771-790.  
Barry B (1995) John Rawls and the Search for Stability. Ethics 105(4): 874-915. 
Cohen J (1993) Moral pluralism and political consensus. In Copp D, Hampton J and Roemer J (eds.), The 
Idea of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 270-91. 
Cohen J (1994), A More Democratic Liberalism. Michigan Law Review 92(6): 1503-1546. 
Cohen J (2009) Truth and Public Reason. Philosophy & Public Affairs 37(1): 2-42. 
32 
 
Dreben B (2003) On Rawls and Political Liberalism. In Freeman S (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 316-346. 
Dworkin R (2000), Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Estlund D (1998) The Insularity of the Reasonable: Why Political Liberalism Must Admit the Truth. 
Ethics 108: 252-275. 
Forst R (2007), Die Rechtfertigung der Gerechtigkeit: Rawls‘ Politischer Liberalismus und Habermas‘ 
Diskurstheorie in der Diskussion. Reprinted in his Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung: Elemente einer 
konstruktivistischen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, Ch. 4. 
Galston WA (1989) Pluralism and Social Unity. Ethics 99(4): 711-26. 
Galston WA (2009) Realism and Moralism in Political Theory. In Young SP (ed.), Reflections on Rawls: 
An Assessment of his Legacy. Farnham: Ashgate, Ch. 6. 
Gauthier D (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Geuss R (2008), Philosophy and Real Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gowan P (2001), Neoliberal Cosmopolitanism. New Left Review 11: 79-93. 
Habermas J (1995), Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls‘s 
Political Liberalism. The Journal of Philosophy 92(3): 109-131. 
Habermas J (1998) ―Reasonable‖ versus ―True,‖ or the Morality of Worldviews. In his Inclusion of the 
Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. by C. Cronin and P. de Gruff, trans. by C. Cronin. 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Hill TE Jr.(2000) The Problem of Stability in Political Liberalism. Reprinted in his Respect, Pluralism, 
and Justice: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 9. 
Krasnoff L (1998) Consensus, Stability, and Normativity in Rawls‘s Political Liberalism. Journal of 
Philosophy 95(6): 269-292. 
33 
 
Kymlicka W (2002), Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1990], 
second edition. 
Laden AS (2003) The House That Jack Built: Thirty Years of Reading Rawls. Ethics 113(2): 367-390. 
Larmore C (1990) Political Liberalism. Political Theory 18(3): 339-360.  
Larmore C (1999), The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism. Journal of Philosophy 96(12): 599-625. 
McCarthy T (1994) Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue. 
Ethics 105(1): 44-63. 
Macebo S (1990) The Politics of Justification. Political Theory 18(2): 280-304. 
Morgenthau HJ (1948) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred 
Knopf. 
Peritz D (unpublished) Substantive and Procedural Democracy: Reflections on the Reasonable and the 
Rational in Rawls and Habermas. Available at http://pages.slc.edu/~dperitz/papers/substantive-
and-procedural.pdf.  
Rawls (1995) Reply to Habermas. The Journal of Philosophy 92(3): 132-180. Reprinted in PL, lecture IX. 
[References to the reprinted version; abbreviated ‗RH‘.] 
Rawls J (1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, [1993], paperback edition. 
[Abbreviated ‗PL‘.] 
Rawls J (1999) Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Abbreviated ‗LP‘] 
Rawls J (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. by E. Kelly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. [Abbreviated ‗JF‘.] 
Rawls J (2007) Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. by S. Freeman. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. [Abbreviated ‗LHPP‘.] 
Raz J (1990), Facing Diversity: the Case of Epistemic Abstinence. Philosophy & Public Affairs 19(1): 3-
46. 
34 
 
Scanlon TM (2003) Rawls on Justification. In Freeman S (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 3. 
Schaub J (2009), Gerechtigkeit und Versöhnung. John Rawls’ politischer Liberalismus. Frankfurt/New 
York: Campus. 
Scheffler S (1994) The Appeal of Political Liberalism. Ethics 105(1): 4-22. 
Shklar J (1998), Liberalism of Fear. In her Political Thought and Political Thinkers, ed. by S. Hoffmann. 
Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, Ch. 1. 
Simmons AJ (1999) Justification and Legitimacy. Ethics 109(4): 739-771. 
Williams B (1981) Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Williams B (1985), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana Press. 
Williams B (2005) In the Beginning Was the Deed, ed. by G. Hawthorn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Wenar L (1995) Political Liberalism: an Internal Critique. Ethics 106(1): 32-62. 
Wolf U (1997) Übergreifender Konsens und öffentliche Vernunft. In: Philosophische Gesellschaft Bad 
Homburg & Hinsch W (eds.) Zur Idee des polilitischen Liberalismus: John Rawls in der 
Diskussion. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 52-66. 
 
Author bio 
Fabian Freyenhagen is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Essex, UK. He recently co-edited (with 
J.G. Finlayson) Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political. He also works on the theories of Kant and 
Adorno. 
 
                                                          
Notes 
For critical comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank a number of audiences as well as 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
individuals, especially Paul Bou-Habib, Gordon Finlayson, Tony Laden, Richard Raatzsch, Jörg Schaub, 
Dan Watts, Albert Weale and Leif Wenar as well as two anonymous referees for this journal. 
1 See, for example, PL, xx-xxii, xxixf, xliiif, xlvif, 10-15, 154-158.  
2 Rawls acknowledges, even insists, that political liberalism is a moral conception, by which he 
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4 See, for example, Habermas, 1995, 1998; Raz, 1990; and Barry, 1995. 
5 See, for example, Dreben, 2003; and Larmore, 1990; see also Krasnoff, 1998 and Peritz. A 
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6 RH, §2.  
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8 RH, 386, 389. 
9 For a useful clarification of this method, see Scanlon, 2003.  
10 On liberal legitimacy, see PL, 136-7, 217; see also JF, 41, 84, 186, and especially 89-94.  
11 RH, 386-7. 
12 See Habermas, 1998: 83ff; see also Forst, 2007: 152. 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
13 RH, 387. See also Krasnoff, 1998: 169. 
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15 See PL, 147; JF, 194-5. 
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political values in the political sphere.  
18 See RH, 392. 
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individual checking for whether the political conception is compatible with their comprehensive 
conception of the good) will be affected as much as the third level of justification by the critique that 
follows (though, for the sake of simplicity, I concentrate on the latter). The priority of political values is 
the key issue of contention in both cases.  
20 See also Habermas, 1998: 93. 
21 See JF, 34-5; PL, 38n41. 
22 For doubts that Rawls is right about the political culture of contemporary society, see Galston 
1989; Geuss, 2008, 80-94, especially 85-6, 92; McCarthy, 1994: 61-2; and Wolf, 1997: 61-2; see also PL, 
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23 PL, 101, 172; see also Cohen, 1994: 1509; and Laden, 2003: 386. 
24 Rawls suggests that political philosophy has four functions: (a) conflict-resolution; (b) 
orientation; (c) reconciling citizens to their social world; and (d) expanding what is practical possible (see 
JF, 1-5; LHPP, 10-11). All of these presuppose the possibility of a just regime. Schaub 2009 shows that 
the Hegelian idea of reconciliation plays a central role in Rawls‘ thinking. 
25 See PL, 172. 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
26 Rawls is most explicit about this idea in the international context: ‗While realization is, of 
course, important, I believe that the very possibility of such a social order [i.e., a liberal and decent one] 
can itself reconcile us to the social world. (...) For as long as we believe for good reasons that a self-
sustaining and reasonably just political and social order both at home and abroad is possible, we can 
reasonably hope that we and others will someday, somewhere, achieve it; and we can then do something 
towards this achievement‘ (LP, 128). See also Hill, 2000: 242, 252, 254n31. 
27
 
Rawls is explicit that he aims at hope, but cannot provide a guarantee (PL, 65; see also xlvii-viii; 
JF, 37). His concern with rational hope is also different from making predictions, and this might explain 
why he does not engage in certain empirical enquires which his explanatory quest might suggest that he 
should engage in – such as detailed political sociology or historical analysis. See also Hill, 2000: 248-9; 
and Baier, 1989: 783.  
28 PL, 159; JF, 192. 
29 See, for example, Williams, 2005: 2n2. 
30 According to Rawls, the move beyond a mere modus vivendi will be helped by the following 
advantages of liberal principles of justice: (1) ‗(...) they fix, once and for, all the content of certain 
political basic rights and liberties, and to assign them special priority‘ (PL, 161; JF, 194), which is 
important given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the possible conflicts this could give rise to; (2) their 
application has a certain simplicity which makes it easier for people to check that justice has been done 
(PL, 162; JF, 194); and (3) once institutionalised, the liberal principles encourage the political virtues (PL, 
163; JF, 194), such as fairmindedness, thereby helping to sustain stability for the right reasons. For a 
critique of (1), see Macebo, 1990: 287-8.  
31 PL, 158-168. 
32 PL, 139; see also 155, 393; JF, 183, 189. 
33 PL, 59; see also 140; JF, 190-1. 
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34 PL, 145-6; see also 147, 155, 169-71, and ‗The Idea of Public Reason Revisited‘ [1997] 
(reprinted in LP, 129-180), which contains a number of passages on how religious views can come to 
accept political liberalism. For a more systematic discussion of this ‗model case‘, see Krasnoff, 1998: 
285-9.  
35 PL, 169-171 
36 See PL, 157. 
37 RH, 393-4. 
38 PL, 159-60; JF, 193-4. 
39 See, for example, Habermas, 1998: 93; Wolf, 1997: 64. 
40 Moreover, there is also a tension between saying (a) that political values are great values which 
are not easily overridden by other values (the first reason) and saying (b) that conflict with other values is 
reduced in political liberalism because it includes no claim to the effect that political values are the most 
important values all things considered (the third reason). If (b) is the case, then (a) is either false or needs 
to be weakened and will then not justify the priority of political values. On the other hand, if (a) is meant 
as a claim about values all things considered, then (b) is false and Rawls‘ theory is comprehensive, after 
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41 See PL, 149, where Rawls admits ‗certain kinds of social unity and stability‘ do not necessarily 
require an overlapping consensus of the sort he suggests. He would however maintain that it is only 
possible to have a ‗fair social cooperation (...) on a footing of mutual respect‘, if political values are 
assigned priority (PL, 157; see also LHPP, 5-9).  
42
  On the ‗fact of oppression‘, see PL, 37; JF, 34. 
43 Barry, 1995: section XII-XIII, especially 907, 909-10; on Rawls' view of the family of liberal 
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39 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the family of liberal conceptions (see PL, lviii; LHPP, 13).  
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Krasnoff, 1998: 279-80n8. 
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Wenar, 1995. 
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